Additions and corrections to be made to OMPO2030comments.pdf

Failure to address goals.

Under *Goals*, on page 4, OMPO writes, "To meet our vision, the islandwide transportation plan for Oahu is defined by three overarching goals."

The first goal is to, "Develop and maintain Oahu's island wide transportation system to ensure efficient, safe, convenient and economical movement of people and ***goods."*** (emphasis added)

However, neither the word *goods* nor *freight* appears again in the Draft. This is a significant shortcoming since the delivery of goods is a major policy element given equal weight with people in federal, state and city transportation policies.

On the other hand, the HOT lanes alternative would make a major contribution in reducing the cost of delivering goods and help reduce *the Price of Paradise.*

OMPO's second overarching goal is to, "Develop and maintain Oahu's transportation system in a manner that maintains environmental quality and community cohesiveness. … Minimizes disruption of neighborhoods, ensures compatibility with the physical and social character of existing development."

The Draft says that this is a goal but it does not reveal to the public any of the potential adverse environmental impacts effects of elevated rail.

Since OMPO is using costs from Vancouver's Skytrain, and DTS is using it as an example, it is only appropriate to cite the British Columbia government's Ombudsman's Report about Skytrain.[i] Voters should read this document in its entirety. Here are some brief excerpts from its *Summary of Major Conclusions and Recommendations:*

- "Significant adverse effects of Skytrain on some adjacent residents are loss of privacy, excessive noise, and a decrease in property values.
- Where the track is elevated, the erection of more effective sound barriers on the guideway itself should be considered.
- In the future, wherever practicable, Skytrain should not operate on elevated guideways through residential neighborhoods.
- Noise levels emanating from Skytrain should be reduced, minimally, to 55 decibels." (Estimated noise levels in the 1992 FEIS ranged up to 77 decibels." FEIS, Table 3.13).

During the 1992 rail discussions Hawaii architects expressed a great deal of concern over the impacts of an elevated rail line going through the community just as Seattle architects are showing the same concerns with a potential monorail line.[ii] The Draft should address these problems.

Business and residence displacement and land acquisition.

The Draft contains no mention of land acquisition costs or allows for the cost of necessary relocations of residences and businesses. In prior years, OMPO planning documents available to the public spelled out that such actions would be necessary.

For example, the Oahu Transportation Planning Program, the predecessor organization to OMPO disclosed to the public that,

> "Displacement of families and businesses is the 'sore thumb' of most public construction projects. The proposed rapid transit system is no exception. … Preliminary studies indicate about 39 acres will be required, displacing some 884 households and 430 businesses — primarily in Kalihi, Moiliili and Kaimuki. … cited the $95.6 million price tag assigned relocation and right-of-way acquisition at [1973] prices."[iii]

The $95.6 million in 1973 dollars would be $401 million in 2005 dollars just allowing for normal inflation. However, land values have increased far greater than inflation, which would greatly inflate the $401 million.

As another example, the 1976 PEEP II study, part of the planning for the 1980 Honolulu Area Rapid Transit (HART) study, contained a complete book-size Relocation Plan.

In the 1984 Hali 2000 study, one which preceded the eventual 1992 FEIS, OMPO wrote:

> "The rapid transit alternative could displace up to 5 acres of residential area, primarily at station locations. Approximately 15 acres of commercial property is likely to be displaced primarily in the central Honolulu area between the Civic Center and the University of Hawaii. The majority of the 35 acres of industrial land would be required for a rail yard."[iv]

It is clear from the City's own analysis, that the costs cited in the ORTP Plan do not include any allowance for acquisitions, relocations, and displacements.

The Draft must give the public at least a rough estimate of what these costs might be.

Understated capital costs

The costs used in the Draft emanated from DTS as is detailed in the calculation kindly supplied to us by Mr. Melvin Kaku, its acting Director.[v]

Essentially, the city Department of Transportation Services (DTS) took the cost of Vancouver's Millenium line and adjusted it for "geographical differences" and inflation using the *Civil Works Construction Cost Index System* and the *Price Trends for Federal-Aid Highway Construction*. This produced a cost of $100 million a mile.

However, we do not believe this is the most accurate method to arrive at even a rough approximation of cost. There are too many differences between Hawaii and Canada, a foreign country with different labor laws and currency. In addition, Hawaii has far higher construction costs than other states — and certainly Canada. Hawaii's average cost per lane mile of highway, for example, is 2.5 times the U.S. average.[vi]

A far better method is base calculations on the cost differences between the No-Build option and the 15.9-mile LPA option[vii] in the 1992 FEIS, which Parsons Brinckerhoff, the DTS's current consultant, calculated. That took into account — one assumes — the

additional costs for rail feeder buses, and the high costs of Hawaii's labor laws and the political policies affecting construction peculiar to Hawaii. It may even have take into account land acquisition and relocation costs, even though they would have been much lower *at that time* than they would be today even if we allow for inflation.

The inflation factor between 1991 and 2005 was 31.8 percent.[viii] Applying that to the $1.85 billion cost brings it up to $2.44 billion in today's money, or $153 million per mile.

However, construction costs have risen far higher than inflation. Both the U.S. Government's *Price Trends for Federal-Aid Highway Construction,*[ix] and the *Civil Works Construction Cost Index System* show a 49 percent increase in costs between 1991 and 2005,[x] and applying that to the $1.85 billion gives us $2.76 billion.

In addition, we must allow for the additional 8 miles between Waikele and Kapolei. The 15.9 miles of the 1992 route costing $2.76 billion in 2005 dollars, results in $173 million per mile, or an additional $1.38 billion for the 8-mile extension.

The base cost of $2.76 billion and the $1.38 billion for the Kapolei addition totals to $4.14 billion for the full Kapolei to UH line. This amount is 60 percent higher than the $2.57 billion shown in the Draft — before cost overruns.

Whatever the precise cost, it is obviously far higher than the amount shown in the Draft and OMPO must revise it and give the public an opportunity to comment on it in a new Draft.

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http://www.ombud.gov.bc.ca/reports/Public_Reports/PR8_Sky_Train_Report/summary_of_major_conclusions_and.htm

ii

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/printer2/index.asp?ploc=t&refer=http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/transportation/91672_architecture18.shtml

iii Oahu Transportation Planning Program, March 1973.

iv (Draft, p. 7-8)

v www.honolulutraffic.com/Kaku3.pdf

vi http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/biz/construction/pdf/I-C_Const_Cost.pdf p. 7.

vii FEIS, p. S-16.

viii http://www.hawaii.gov/dbedt/info/economic/databook/db2004/section14.pdf for 1991 to 2004 assuming a 2.3 percent increase for 2005.

ix http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/pt2005q2.pdf

x http://www.usace.army.mil/usace-docs/eng-manuals/em1110-2-1304/entire.pdf